Skip to content

The outbreak of military conflict between Israel and Iran introduces significant uncertainty into the global economy and capital markets, as reflected in recent volatile bond, stock, energy and currency market moves. Investors are justifiably concerned that the conflict could spread, putting at risk global energy supplies and pinching key global transport routes, adding to other sources of geoeconomic uncertainty.

Among the greatest concerns is the potential for spiking oil prices to spur a return to high inflation. As we summarize below, however, the risk of 1970s-style inflation spurred by higher oil prices is relatively low, in our view.

The 1970s

The Great Inflation of the 1970s lasted from 1965 to 1982 and triggered a long, painful period of unemployment and recession. Its legacy was etched on the memory of a generation of central bankers and investors and studied by the following generation.

Contemporary analyses attributed the episode to a range of factors including the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) oil embargo, corporate greed and resolute union leaders.  Importantly, however, inflationary pressures were already present before the 1970s oil price shocks. In the United States, inflation was 5.8% in 1970, as the government spent large sums on the Vietnam War and increased welfare payments. In Japan, it was 6.4%. In the United Kingdom, inflation was 9.4% in 1971. The peaks came in 1974 (European Union [EU]: 13%, Japan: 23%), 1975 (United Kingdom: 24%), and 1980 (United States: 13.5%).1

It is, of course, correct that in 1973, OPEC embargoed oil exports to the United States and European countries, making prices spike up to 400% in days, leading to rationing and triggering a widespread recession in these regions.

However, the link between inflation and oil prices is tenuous, as shown by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.2

  • Geopolitically driven OPEC oil supply disruptions fail to explain the increases in the price of oil.
  • Structural models that allow for both demand and supply shifts in global oil markets indicate that oil demand shocks largely drove these oil price increases.
  • Broader inflationary pressures also explain similar surges in other industrial commodity prices (e.g., paper and pulp, scrap metal, lumber) in the early 1970s. These increases predated the surge in the price of oil, given the regulatory and contractual constraints on the price of oil at the time.

The argument is that oil price increases reflect surges in global demand for industrial commodities ultimately caused by expansionary monetary policy. This would suggest that rising oil prices were a symptom rather than the cause of high US inflation in the 1970s. Not only did US inflation share a common demand component with oil prices, but higher US inflation motivated increases in the price of oil in 1973/74, as OPEC oil producers saw their real foreign exchange earnings erode as the US dollar weakened.

2025

Today’s situation is different in any case. The United States is the second-largest oil exporter in the world, while Iran produces much less than the United States3 and consumes about half of it domestically, leaving only half for export. Further, Iran’s biggest customer, China, pays fixed prices in advance, so there is no benefit to Tehran from a spike in oil prices.

Further, in the 1970s, the benchmark inflation basket commonly tracked across the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States contained oil, kerosene and paraffin for transportation fuel, industry, shipping and residential heating, making it a significant household expenditure item. Today, over half of new car registrations in Europe and China are electric or hybrid electric. The EU generates 48% of its electricity from renewable sources, the United Kingdom 58%,4 China 37%5 and the United States 40%.6 If we look for the biggest dependencies on oil/gas and other fossil fuels, we find Saudi Arabia (99%), Iran (92%), United Arab Emirates (74%) and Russia (64%).7

Meanwhile, OPEC is steadily raising output to regain lost market share. Early indicators suggest OPEC’s new strategy is having the desired impact of stimulating new demand in Asia while disincentivizing investment in new production outside OPEC.

Arguably the most important long-term factor behind the shift in global importance of the price of oil is that China’s once-rapidly rising demand for fossil fuel imports appears to be peaking across several energy sources, especially crude oil, but also potentially coal and gas. As a result, China may soon join Europe and North America as the third major global economic region to experience a peak in fossil fuel imports. China’s emissions may have peaked thanks to its clean power boom.

As a result, global demand growth for oil going forward will likely be much lower, as other major emerging economies, especially India, will not fully make up for the loss of China’s past growth, in our view.

This could be positive for regions that rely on fuel imports, including Northeast Asia, Europe and India, while it could pose a fiscal challenge for producers, including OPEC states and Russia.

For the United States, lower growth in demand for oil would have a mixed impact, as the nation is the world’s largest oil and gas producer but also the biggest consumer of energy.



Important Legal Information

This document is for information only and does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation and was prepared without regard to the specific objectives, financial situation or needs of any particular person who may receive it. This document may not be reproduced, distributed or published without prior written permission from Franklin Templeton.

Any research and analysis contained in this document has been procured by Franklin Templeton for its own purposes and may be acted upon in that connection and, as such, is provided to you incidentally. Although information has been obtained from sources that Franklin Templeton believes to be reliable, no guarantee can be given as to its accuracy and such information may be incomplete or condensed and may be subject to change at any time without notice. Any views expressed are the views of the fund manager as of the date of this document and do not constitute investment advice. The underlying assumptions and these views are subject to change based on market and other conditions and may differ from other portfolio managers or of the firm as a whole. 

There is no assurance that any prediction, projection or forecast on the economy, stock market, bond market or the economic trends of the markets will be realized. Franklin Templeton accepts no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect consequential loss arising from the use of any information, opinion or estimate herein.

The value of investments and the income from them can go down as well as up and you may not get back the full amount that you invested. Past performance is not necessarily indicative nor a guarantee of future performance.

Copyright© 2025 Franklin Templeton. All rights reserved. Issued by Templeton Asset Management Ltd. Registration Number (UEN) 199205211E.

CFA® and Chartered Financial Analyst® are trademarks owned by CFA Institute.